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Human Error and Commercial Aviation Accidents:
A Comprehensive, Fine-Grained Analysis Using HFACS
“Flying is not inherently dangerous, but to an even greater extent than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving ….”
—Captain A. G. Lumplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group

Since Silas Christofferson first carried passengers on his
hydroplane between San Francisco and Oakland harbors
in 1913, engineers and psychologists have endeavored to
improve the safety of passenger and cargo flight. What
began as an industry fraught with adversity and at times
tragedy has emerged as arguably one of the safest modes
of transportation today.
Indeed, no one can question the tremendous strides
that have been made since those first passenger flights
nearly a century ago. However, while commercial aviation accident rates have reached unprecedented levels of
safety, little, if any, improvement has been realized over
the last decade for either the air carrier or commuter/air
taxi industry (Figure 1). Indeed, some have even suggested that the current accident rate is as good as it gets
– or is it?
The challenge for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other civil aviation safety organizations
is to improve an already very safe industry. The question
is where to start when most of the “low hanging fruit”
(e.g., improved powerplant and airframe technology,
advanced avionics, and the introduction of automation)
have been “picked.”
Although percentages vary, most would agree that
somewhere between 60-80% of aviation accidents are
due, at least in part, to human error (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996). That being said, it may be surprising that
with few exceptions (e.g., Billings & Reynard, 1984;
Gaur, 2005; Li, Baker, Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001;
Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b; Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003) most studies to date have focused on
situational factors or pilot demographics, rather than
the underlying human error causes of accidents. While
no one disagrees that factors like weather, lighting (i.e.,
day versus night), and terrain contribute to accidents,
pilots have little, if any, control over them. Likewise,
little can be done to affect one’s gender, age, occupation,

or even flight experience, as flight hours alone are not
the sole determinant of a safe pilot.
Judging from current accident rates, situational and
pilot demographic data alone have provided little in the
way of preventing accidents, apart from identifying target
populations for the dissemination of safety information.
This is not to say that these variables are unimportant,
nor would anyone argue that they do not influence
aviation safety. However, given the multi-factorial nature
of accidents (Baker, 1995), it may make more sense to
examine these variables within the context of what we
know about human error and accident causation. Perhaps
then we might be able to affect human error and reduce
aviation accidents beyond current levels.
The problem is that, unlike situational and demographic variables that are tangible and well-defined (e.g.,
instrument meteorological conditions and visual meteorological conditions), human error is much more complex,
making it difficult to apply any sort of taxonomy that is
both easily understood and universally accepted. However,
that may have changed with the development of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
in the mid-1990s. In fact, since the U.S. Navy/Marine
Corps fielded the original version in 1997, HFACS has
been used to reliably investigate and classify human error
in a variety of high-risk settings including civilian aviation (Gaur,
ShappellRate
& Wiegmann,
2003a, 2003b,
Figure
1. 135 &2005;
121 Accident
by year
2004; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a, 2003).
4 .5
Commuter
Air Carrier

4
Accidents per 100,000 Flight Hours

INTRODUCTION

3 .5
3
2 .5
2
1 .5
1
0 .5
0
85

86 87 88

89

90

91

92 93 94

95

Year

96

97

9 8 9 9 '0 0 '0 1 '0 2 '0 3 '0 4

Figure 1. Air carrier and commuter/air taxi accident
rates since 1985 (Source: NTSB).
The FAA distinguishes between two types of commercial operations:
those occurring under 14 CFR Part 121 – Air Carrier Operations
and those occurring under CFR Part 135 - Commuter/air taxi
operations.
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Figure 2. The HFACS framework.

HFACS

most settings, they differ markedly when the rules and
regulations of an organization are considered. That is,
while errors represent authorized behavior that fails to
meet the desired outcome, violations refer to the willful
disregard of the rules and regulations. It is within these
two overarching categories that HFACS describes three
types of errors (decision, skill-based, and perceptual) and
two types of violations (routine and exceptional).

It is generally accepted that (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001a, 2003) aviation accidents are typically the result of
a chain of events that often culminate with the unsafe acts
of operators (aircrew). The aviation industry is not alone
in this belief, as the safety community has embraced a
sequential theory of accident investigation since Heinrich
first published his axioms of industrial safety in 1931
(Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1931). However, it was
not until Reason published his “Swiss cheese” model of
human error in 1990 that the aviation community truly
began to examine human error in a systematic manner.
Drawing upon Reason’s (1990) concept of latent and
active failures, HFACS describes human error at each of
four levels: 1) the unsafe acts of operators (e.g., aircrew,
maintainers, air traffic controllers), 2) preconditions for
unsafe acts, 3) unsafe supervision (i.e., middle-management), and 4) organizational influences (Figure 2). A
brief description of each causal category is provided to
familiarize the reader.

Errors
Decision errors. One of the more common error forms,
decision errors, represents conscious, goal-intended
behavior that proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves
inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Often
referred to as honest mistakes, these errors typically manifest as poorly executed procedures, improper choices, or
simply the misinterpretation and/or misuse of relevant
information.
Skill-based errors. In contrast to decision errors, the
second error form, skill-based errors, occurs with little
or no conscious thought. Indeed, just as decision errors
can be thought of as “thinking” errors, skill-based errors
can be thought of as “doing” errors. For instance, little
thought goes into turning one’s steering wheel or shifting gears in an automobile. Likewise, basic flight skills
such as stick and rudder movements and visual scanning
refer more to how one does something rather than where
one is going or why. The difficulty with these highly

Unsafe Acts of Operators
The unsafe acts of operators (aircrew) can be loosely
classified into one of two categories: errors and violations (Reason, 1990). While both are common within


A complete description of all 19 HFACS causal categories is available
elsewhere (see Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).



practiced and seemingly automatic behaviors is that they
are particularly susceptible to attention and/or memory
failures. As a result, skill-based errors frequently appear
- the breakdown in visual scan patterns, inadvertent activation/deactivation of switches, forgotten intentions, and
omitted items in checklists. Even the manner (or skill)
with which one flies an aircraft (aggressive, tentative, or
controlled) can affect safety.
Perceptual errors. While decision and skill-based errors have dominated most accident databases and have,
therefore, been included in most error frameworks, the
third and final error form, perceptual errors, has received
comparatively less attention. No less important, these
“perceiving” errors arise when sensory input is degraded,
or “unusual” as is often the case when flying at night, in
the weather, or in other visually impoverished environments. Faced with acting on imperfect or incomplete
information, aircrew run the risk of misjudging distances,
altitude, and decent rates, as well as responding incorrectly
to a variety of visual/vestibular illusions.

are described: 1) condition of the operator, 2) personnel
factors, and 3) environmental factors.
Condition of the Operator
Adverse mental states. Being prepared mentally is critical
in nearly every endeavor; perhaps it is even more so in
aviation. With this in mind, the first of three categories,
adverse mental states, was created to account for those
mental conditions that adversely affect performance and
contribute to unsafe acts. Principal among these are the
loss of situational awareness, mental fatigue, circadian
dysrhythmia, and pernicious attitudes such as overconfidence, complacency, and misplaced motivation.
Adverse physiological states. Equally important, however,
are those adverse physiological states that preclude the
safe conduct of flight. Particularly important to aviation
are conditions such as spatial disorientation, visual illusions, hypoxia, illness, intoxication, and a whole host of
pharmacological and medical abnormalities known to
affect performance. It is important to understand that
conditions like spatial disorientation are physiological
states that cannot be turned on or off – they just exist.
As a result, these adverse physiological states often lead
to the commission of unsafe acts like perceptual errors.
For instance, it is not uncommon in aviation for a pilot
to become spatially disoriented (adverse physiological
state) and subsequently misjudge the aircraft’s pitch or
attitude (perceptual error), resulting in a loss of control
and/or collision with the terrain.
Physical and/or mental limitations. The third and final
category of substandard conditions, physical/mental limitations, includes those instances when necessary sensory
information is either unavailable, or if available, individuals simply do not have the aptitude, skill, or time to safely
deal with it. In aviation, the former often includes not
seeing other aircraft or obstacles due to the size and/or
contrast of the object in the visual field. Likewise, there
are instances when an individual simply may not possess
the necessary aptitude, physical ability, or proficiency
to operate safely. After all, just as not everyone can play
linebacker for their favorite professional football team
or be a concert pianist, not everyone has the aptitude or
physical attributes necessary to fly aircraft.

Violations
Routine violations. Although there are many ways to
distinguish between types of violations, two distinct forms
have been identified based on their etiology. The first,
routine violations tend to be habitual by nature and are
often enabled by a system of supervision and management
that tolerates such departures from the rules (Reason,
1990). Often referred to as “bending the rules,” the classic example is that of the individual who drives his/her
automobile consistently 5-10 mph faster than allowed
by law. While clearly against the law, the behavior is, in
effect, sanctioned by local authorities (police) who often
will not enforce the law until speeds in excess of 10 mph
over the posted limit are observed.
Exceptional violations. These types of violations, on the
other hand, are isolated departures from authority, neither
typical of the individual nor condoned by management.
For example, while authorities might condone driving 65
in a 55 mph zone, driving 105 mph in a 55 mph zone
would almost certainly result in a speeding ticket. It is
important to note that, while most exceptional violations
are appalling, they are not considered “exceptional” because of their extreme nature. Rather, they are regarded
as exceptional because they are neither typical of the
individual nor condoned by authority.

Personnel Factors
Often times, things that we do to ourselves will lead to
undesirable conditions and unsafe acts as described above.
Referred to as personnel factors, these preconditions have
been divided into two general categories: crew resource
management and personal readiness.
Crew resource management (CRM). It is not hard to
imagine that when all members of the crew are not acting in a coordinated manner, confusion (adverse mental

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Simply focusing on unsafe acts, however, is like
focusing on a patient’s symptoms without understanding the underlying disease state that caused it. As such,
investigators must dig deeper into the preconditions for
unsafe acts. Within HFACS, three major subdivisions


state) and poor decisions in the cockpit can ensue. Crew
resource mismanagement, as it is referred to here, includes
the failures of both inter- and intra-cockpit communication, as well as communication with Air Traffic Control
(ATC )and other ground personnel. This category also
includes those instances when crewmembers do not work
together as a team, or when individuals directly responsible
for the conduct of operations fail to coordinate activities
before, during, and after a flight.
Personal readiness. Individuals must, by necessity, ensure
that they are adequately prepared for flight. Consequently,
the category of personal readiness was created to account
for those instances when rules such as disregarding crew
rest requirements, violating alcohol restrictions, or selfmedicating, are not adhered to. However, even behaviors
that do not necessarily violate existing rules or regulations (e.g., running ten miles before piloting an aircraft
or not observing good dietary practices) may reduce the
operating capabilities of the individual and are, therefore,
captured here as well.

checklist design, and automation, to name a few. Indeed,
one of the classic design problems first discovered in
aviation was the similarity between the controls used
to raise and lower the flaps and those used to raise and
lower the landing gear. Such similarities often caused
confusion among pilots, resulting in the frequent raising
of the landing gear while still on the ground. Likewise,
automation designed to improve human performance
can have unforeseen consequences. For example, highly
reliable automation has been shown to induce adverse
mental states such as overconfidence and complacency,
resulting in pilots following the instructions of the automation even when “common sense” suggests otherwise.
In contrast, unreliable automation can often result in a
lack of confidence and disuse of automation even though
aided performance is safer than unaided performance
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000).
Unsafe Supervision
Clearly, aircrews are responsible for their actions and,
as such, must be held accountable. However, in some instances, they are the unwitting inheritors of latent failures
attributable to those who supervise them. To account for
these latent failures, the overarching category of unsafe
supervision was created within which four categories
(inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problems, and supervisory
violations) are included.
Inadequate supervision. This category refers to failures
within the supervisory chain of command as a direct result
of some supervisory action or inaction. At a minimum,
supervisors must provide the opportunity for individuals to succeed. It is expected, therefore, that individuals
will receive adequate training, professional guidance,
oversight, and operational leadership, and that all will
be managed appropriately. When this is not the case,
aircrew can become isolated, thereby increasing the risks
associated with day-to-day operations.
Planned inappropriate operations. The risk associated
with supervisory failures come in many forms. Occasionally, for example, the operational tempo and/or schedule
are planned such that individuals are put at unacceptable
risk and, ultimately, performance is adversely affected. As
such, the category of planned inappropriate operations
was created to account for all aspects of improper or
inappropriate crew scheduling and operational planning,
which may focus on such issues as crew pairing, crew rest,
and managing the risk associated with specific flights.
Failed to correct known problems. The remaining two
categories of unsafe supervision, the failure to correct
known problems and supervisory violations, are similar,
yet considered separately within HFACS. The failure to
correct known problems refers to those instances when

Environmental Factors
Although not human per se, environmental factors
can also contribute to the substandard conditions of
operators and hence to unsafe acts. Very broadly, these
environmental factors can be captured within two general
categories: the physical environment and the technological environment.
Physical environment. The impact that the physical
environment can have on aircrew has long been known
and much has been documented in the literature on
this topic (e.g., Nicogossian, Huntoon, & Pool, 1994;
Reinhart, 1996). The term physical environment refers
to both the operational environment (e.g., weather,
altitude, terrain), as well as the ambient environment,
such as heat, vibration, lighting, and toxins in the cockpit. For example, flying into adverse weather reduces
visual cues, which can lead to spatial disorientation and
perceptual errors. Other aspects of the physical environment such as heat can cause dehydration, which reduces
a pilot’s alertness level, producing a subsequent slowing
of decision-making processes or even the inability to
control the aircraft. Likewise, a loss of pressurization at
high altitudes or maneuvering at high altitudes without
supplemental oxygen in unpressurized aircraft can result
in hypoxia, which leads to delirium, confusion, and a
host of unsafe acts.
Technological environment. Pilots that often find themselves in a technological environment that can also have
a tremendous impact on their performance. Within the
context of HFACS, the term technological environment
encompasses a variety of issues, including the design of
equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics,


deficiencies among individuals, equipment, training, or
other related safety areas are “known” to the supervisor,
yet are allowed to continue uncorrected. For example, the
failure to consistently correct or discipline inappropriate
behavior certainly fosters an unsafe atmosphere but is not
considered a violation if no specific rules or regulations
were broken.
Supervisory violations. This category is reserved for those
instances when supervisors willfully disregard existing
rules and regulations. For instance, permitting aircrew
to operate an aircraft without current qualifications or
license is a flagrant violation that may set the stage for
the tragic sequence of events that may follow.

rules and values, confusion abounds, and safety suffers
within an organization.
Operational process. Finally, operational process refers
to formal processes (operational tempo, time pressures,
production quotas, incentive systems, schedules, etc.),
procedures (performance standards, objectives, documentation, instructions about procedures, etc.), and oversight
within the organization (organizational self-study, risk
management, and the establishment and use of safety
programs). Poor upper-level management and decisions
concerning each of these organizational factors can also
have a negative, albeit indirect, effect on operator performance and system safety.

Organizational Influences
Where decisions and practices by front-line supervisors
and middle-management can adversely impact aircrew
performance, fallible decisions of upper-level management may directly affect supervisors and the personnel
they manage. Unfortunately, these organizational influences often go unnoticed or unreported by even the
best-intentioned accident investigators. The HFACS
framework describes three latent organizational failures:
1) resource management, 2) organizational climate, and
3) operational processes.
Resource management. This category refers to the
management, allocation, and maintenance of organizational resources, including human resource management
(selection, training, staffing), monetary safety budgets,
and equipment design (ergonomic specifications). In
general, corporate decisions about how such resources
should be managed center around two distinct objectives
– the goal of safety and the goal of on-time, cost-effective
operations. In times of prosperity, both objectives can
be easily balanced and satisfied. However, there may
also be times of fiscal austerity that demand some give
and take between the two. Unfortunately, history tells
us that safety is often the loser in such battles, as safety
and training are often the first to be cut in organizations
experiencing financial difficulties.
Organizational climate. The concept of an organization’s culture has been described in many ways; however,
here it refers to a broad class of organizational variables
that influence worker performance. One telltale sign
of an organization’s climate is its structure, as reflected
in the chain-of-command, delegation of authority and
responsibility, communication channels, and formal
accountability for actions. Just like in the cockpit,
communication and coordination are vital within an
organization. However, an organization’s policies and
culture are also good indicators of its climate. Consequently, when policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or
conflicting, or when they are supplanted by unofficial

PURPOSE
The goal of the present study was twofold: 1) to extend our previous HFACS analyses beyond military and
general aviation (GA) to include a comprehensive analysis
of commercial aviation; and 2) to combine the power
of a theoretically derived human error framework (i.e.,
HFACS) with traditional situational and demographic
data from the accident records. In accomplishing both
objectives, the present study will begin to quantify the
role human error plays in the genesis of commercial
aviation accidents.

METHOD
Data
Commercial aviation accident data (i.e., 14 CFR Part
121 – air carrier; 14 CFR Part 135 – commuter) from
calendar years 1990-2002 were obtained from databases
maintained by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) and the FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data
Analysis Center (NASDAC). The NTSB reports two levels
of investigation: factual and final. The factual investigation
is a preliminary report that only includes basic descriptive information associated with the accident (location,
time-of-day, weather conditions, etc.) but lists no causal
factors. The final report contains all the information in
the factual report as well as the causal factors associated
with the accident. Consequently, only final reports were
included in this study.
Also eliminated from consideration were accidents
that were classified as having “undetermined causes”
and those that were attributed to sabotage, suicide, or
criminal activity (e.g., stolen aircraft). The data were
culled further to include only those accidents that involved aircrew or supervisory error. Of the remaining
1,020 accidents, 181 involved air carrier aircraft and
839 involved commuter aircraft.


Table 1. Frequency of Accidents Associated with an Aircrew or Supervisory
Human Error.
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Total
Average

Aircrew/Supervisory Error Only
Air Carrier
Commuter
Combined
9
81
90
10
71
81
9
67
76
14
67
81
11
74
85
13
59
72
14
71
85
22
68
90
14
62
76
15
62
77
20
62
82
18
52
70
12
43
55
181
839
1020
13.92
64.54
78.46

Total
Accidents
134
121
103
99
113
105
123
130
121
120
135
120
92
1516
116.6

Percentage
67%
67%
74%
82%
75%
69%
69%
69%
63%
64%
61%
58%
60%
68%

Note: Percentages represent the percent of commercial (both air carrier and commuter) aviation
accidents associated with aircrew/supervisory error. For example, 90 of 134 commercial aviation
accidents (67%) were associated with aircrew and/or supervisory error.

A summary of the remaining air carrier and commuter
accidents involving aircrew or supervisory error is presented in Table 1. Sixty-eight percent of all commercial
aviation accidents included in this study involved some
form of aircrew or supervisory error.

on the classification of causal factors within the HFACS
framework more than 85% of the time, an excellent
level of agreement considering that this was essentially a
classification/decision-making task.
Human Factors Quality Assurance
The data used in this study were drawn from NTSB/
NASDAC investigation reports that are often highly
technical in nature, requiring a fundamental understanding of specific terms, flight conditions, and the
overall domain of aviation to be effectively classified
and coded. As aviation SMEs, the pilot-raters were able
to clearly understand all aspects of the accident report.
Consequently, they were considered the appropriate
personnel for conducting the overall HFACS analysis of
the commercial accident reports.
Pilots, however, are not SMEs in the domain of psychology or human factors and may not fully understand the
theoretical underpinnings associated with the various error
types within the HFACS framework. As a result, pilots
might classify human error data somewhat differently
than SMEs in human factors. On the other hand, pilots
in this study were trained on HFACS, which provided
some level of expertise when assessing human error. In
fact, an earlier study addressed this issue by comparing
the coded database of a commercial pilot rater to that of a
psychologist and found the data to be reliable (Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2001a).
Nonetheless, to ensure that the pilot raters grasped
the psychological aspects underlying human error and
HFACS, four additional SMEs (all co-authors of this
manuscript) with expertise in human factors/aviation
psychology examined each HFACS classification that the
pilot SMEs had assigned to a given human cause factor.

Causal Factor Analysis Using HFACS
Six pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma City
area as subject-matter experts (SMEs). All were certified
flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000 flight hours
at the time they were recruited.
Each pilot was provided roughly 16 hours of instruction on the HFACS framework, which included didactic
lecture and practice (with feedback) using the HFACS
framework with NTSB/NASDAC accident reports. After
training, the pilot-raters were randomly assigned accidents so at least two separate pilot-raters independently
analyzed each accident.
Using narrative and tabular data obtained from both
the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters were
instructed to classify each aircrew or supervisory causal
factor identified by the NTSB using the HFACS framework. Note that only those causal and contributory factors identified by the NTSB were classified. That is, the
pilot-raters were instructed not to introduce additional
casual factors that were not identified by the original
investigation.
After the pilot-raters made their initial classifications
of the NTSB causal factors (i.e., skill-based error, decision-error, etc.), the two independent ratings were compared. Where disagreements existed, the corresponding
pilot-raters were instructed to reconcile their differences,
and the consensus classification was included in the
database for further analysis. Overall, pilot-raters agreed


Table 2. Frequency and percentage of accidents associated with
each HFACS causal category by type of operation.
HFACS Category

Air Carrier

Commuter

Total

Organizational Influences

N (%)

N (%)

N (%)

Resource Management
Organizational Climate
Operational Process
Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Supervisory Violations
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts
Environmental Conditions
Technological Environment
Physical Environment
Conditions of the Operator
Adverse Mental States
Adverse Physiological States
Physical/Mental Limitations
Personnel Factors
Crew Resource Management
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts of the Operator
Skill-based Errors
Decision Errors
Perceptual Errors
Violations

4 (2.2)
0 (0.0)
21 (11.6)

0 (0.0)
4 (0.5)
29 (3.5)

4 (0.4)
4 (0.4)
50 (4.9)

15 (8.3)
3 (1.7)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

21 (2.5)
5 (0.6)
0 (0.0)
2 (0.2)

36 (3.5)
8 (0.8)
0 (0.0)
2 (0.2)

11 (6.1)
67 (37.0)

4 (0.5)
525 (62.6)

15 (1.5)
592 (58.0)

6 (3.3)
6 (3.3)
6 (3.3)

60 (7.2)
18 (2.1)
39 (4.6)

66 (6.5)
24 (2.4)
45 (4.4)

34 (18.8)
0 (0.0)

75 (8.9)
3 (0.4)

109 (10.7)
3 (0.3)

77 (42.5)
71 (39.2)
10 (5.5)
31 (17.1)

499 (59.5)
303 (36.1)
56 (6.7)
205 (24.4)

576 (56.5)
374 (36.7)
66 (6.5)
236 (23.1)

Note: Numbers in the table are frequencies and percentages (parentheses) of accidents that
involved at least one instance of an HFACS category. For example 77 of the 181 air
carrier accidents (77/181 or 42.5%) were associated with at least one skill-based error.
Because accidents are generally associated with more than one causal factor, the
percentages in the table do not add up to 100%.

To aid in the process, descriptive statistics were used to
identify outliers in the data, after which the corresponding
NTSB/NASDAC report was obtained. The reports were
then independently reviewed by a minimum of two human factors SMEs for agreement with the previous codes.
After the human factors SMEs came to a consensus, the
codes were either changed in the database or left as the
pilot SMEs originally coded them. In the end, less than
5% of all causal factors were modified during the human
factors quality assurance process.

such as inadequate or non-existent procedures, directives,
standards, and/or requirements, or in the case of commuter operations, inadequate surveillance of operations.
Unsafe supervision, on the other hand, typically involved
inadequate supervision, in general, or the failure to provide
adequate training.
As anticipated, a large number of environmental conditions were identified within the commercial aviation
database, particularly those associated with aspects of the
physical environment like weather and lighting. However,
they were not uniformly distributed across air carrier
and commuter operations, as considerably more issues
associated with the physical environment were observed
during commuter (63%) than air carrier operations
(37%). In contrast, the accident record revealed surprisingly few problems associated with the technological
environment.
Preconditions associated with aircrew were also frequently observed within the accident record. For instance,
crew resource management failures were identified in nearly
one out of every five air carrier accidents examined. Even
more interesting, the nature of the CRM failure differed

RESULTS
Overall
A summary of the HFACS analyses of commercial
aviation accidents can be found in Table 2. What is apparent from the data is that the majority of human causal
factors identified in the database involved aircrew and their
environment (i.e., unsafe acts of operators and preconditions
for unsafe acts) rather than supervisory or organizational
factors. Nevertheless, when organizational influences
were observed, they typically involved operational processes


between the two commercial operations. That is, while
over 60% of the CRM failures associated with air carrier
accidents involved “inflight” CRM failures (inflight crew
coordination, communication, monitoring of activities,
etc.), over 80% of the CRM failures observed during
commuter operations involved “preflight” activities (such
as planning and briefing).
Although arguably not as common, the condition of
the operator was cited as a causal factor in several of the
accidents examined. For instance, adverse mental states
(e.g., diverted attention, pressure, etc.) were identified
in just over 7% of the commuter accidents, followed
by physical/mental limitations (lack of experience) and
adverse physiological states (spatial disorientation, visual
illusions, etc.).
As seen in other aviation operations (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 1995, 1997, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Wiegmann
& Shappell, 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) the majority of
commercial aviation accident causal factors were found
at the unsafe act level. Indeed, just over half of the accidents were associated with at least one skill-based error,
followed by decision errors (36.7%) and violations of the
rules and regulations (23.1%). Perceptual errors were
much less common, accounting for roughly 7% of the
accidents in the database.
Because of the differences between air carrier and
commuter operations (i.e., airframes, crew composition, size of the organization, etc.) it was anticipated
that there would be differences in the pattern of human
error observed - particularly where the unsafe acts of
aircrew were concerned. However, a comparison of the
unsafe acts committed during these operations (Figure 3)
yielded very little disparity. In fact, the only significant
difference involved skill-based errors, which were nearly
twice as likely to have occurred during accidents involving
commuter than air carrier aircraft (Χ2 = 17.368, p<.001;
odds ratio = 1.982). On the surface, it did appear that
slightly more violations were committed during accidents
involving commuter than air carrier operations; however,
the difference was not statistically significant. Likewise,
the small differences observed for decision and perceptual
errors did not reach statistical significance.
Similar to other civil aviation accident data we have
reported (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b, 2004;
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), there was little variation

in the distribution of unsafe acts committed annually by
aircrew flying either air carrier or commuter operations
(Figure 4). When accidents occurred in either type of
commercial operation, they were typically associated with
more skill-based errors, followed by decision errors, violations, and perceptual errors, respectively. This was true
even though the air carrier data had to be averaged over
3-4 year blocks due to the small number of accidents in
the database (Figure 4A). Moreover, with the exception
of violations, which has shown a slight increase since the
1993-1995 time frame, the annualized data were relatively
flat, suggesting that there has been little impact on any
specific type of human error over the last 13 years.
14 CFR Part 135 - Commuter Operations
Because of the relatively small number of air carrier
accidents in the database related to aircrew/supervisory
error, additional fine-grained analyses of those data were
not possible. However, the same was not true for commuter operations. Therefore, a series of more detailed
analyses were conducted using these data.
Visual Conditions
Given the relatively large percentage of accidents associated with physical conditions, in particular those associated
with prevailing weather conditions and lighting, it seemed
reasonable to begin with these two environmental causal
factors. As can be seen in Figure 5A, just over 70% of the
accidents occurred during visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Likewise, roughly 70% of the accidents
occurred in broad daylight (Figure 5B).
To capitalize on the threat posed by both environmental causal factors, the two were combined to create
a new variable that captured the “visual” conditions at
the time of the accident. Specifically, two levels of visual
conditions were created: 1) clear visual conditions, which
included accidents that occurred during VMC and daylight conditions, and 2) impoverished visual conditions,
which included accidents occurring during instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC) or at twilight/night.
Unlike the results seen with weather and lighting conditions alone, when they were combined, the percentage
of accidents occurring in clear visual conditions were
only marginally higher than those occurring in visually
impoverished conditions (Figure 5C). It would appear
that, while weather and lighting conditions are important
factors in aviation, their impact is potentially magnified
when a pilot’s ability to see outside the aircraft is taken
into consideration.



The overarching category of violations was used rather than the subordinate
categories of routine and exceptional violations because differentiating between
the two, post hoc, is complicated by the fact that most investigations do not
provide the detail necessary to make a reliable distinction between the two
types of violations.
	
Given that Chi square analyses are strongly influenced by sample size, a
conservative p-value of p<.001 was adopted to reduce the likelihood that
spurious significant results would be obtained.
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Table 3. Commuter Unsafe Acts Fine-Grained Analysis by Clear vs. Impoverished.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS
CLEAR
Subject

IMPOVERISHED
N (%)

Compensation for Wind Conditions
Airspeed
Visual Lookout

42 (10.8)
38 (9.7)
32 (8.2)

Subject

N (%)

Aircraft Control
Airspeed

28 (10.6)
27 (10.2)

Clearance

21 (7.9)

DECISION ERRORS
IMPOVERISHED

CLEAR
Subject
Unsuitable Terrain Selection
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Pre-flight Planning/Decision

N (%)
43 (21.5)
38 (19.0)
21 (10.5)

Subject
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Flight into Known Adverse Weather
Pre-flight Planning/Decision

N (%)
37 (24.3)
11 (7.2)
9 (5.9)

Violations
Subject
Procedures/Directives
Checklist
Refueling

CLEAR

N (%)
15 (23.8)
9 (14.3)
6 (9.5)

IMPOVERISHED
Subject
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC
Procedures/Directives
Flight into Known Adverse Weather

N (%)
53 (30.1)
39 (22.2)
10 (5.7)

Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given causal factor within the HFACS category (e.g.,
compensation for wind conditions accounted for 42 of 390 [10.8%] skill-based errors occurring in clear
conditions).

Injury Severity
Previous investigations of GA accidents have shown
distinct differences in the pattern of human error associated with fatal and non-fatal aviation accidents (Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b; Wiegmann & Shappell,
2003). A similar examination of commuter accidents
revealed that roughly 30% of all commuter accidents
resulted in at least one fatality (Figure 6A).
As with the findings regarding visual conditions,
skill-based errors were associated with the majority of
fatal and non-fatal accidents followed by decision errors,
violations, and perceptual errors (Figure 6B). Of note
however, violations were more than three times as likely to
be associated with fatal accidents (Χ2 = 48.239, p<.001;
odds ratio = 3.145).
Upon closer examination, it appears that causal factors such as intentional VFR flight into IMC (violation),
poor in-flight planning/decision making (decision error),
and control of the aircraft and airspeed (skill-based error)
were the most frequently cited aircrew errors associated
with fatal accidents (Table 4). In contrast, non-fatal
accidents appear to be more closely associated with the
failure to compensate for winds (skill-based error), loss
of directional control on the ground (skill-based error),
selection of unsuitable terrain (decision error), poor inflight planning/decision-making (decision error), and the
failure to follow procedures/directives (violation).
Given the similarity in the pattern of human errors
associated with visual conditions and injury severity (fatal

Naturally, one would expect the pattern of human error
to be different during accidents in clear versus visually
impoverished conditions. Indeed, when visual conditions
were compared across the unsafe acts of aircrew, an interesting pattern of human error emerged. While skill-based
errors were the most common error form observed during
accidents in clear and impoverished conditions (Figure
5D), violations were five times more likely to be attributed
to accidents in visually impoverished conditions (Χ2 =
92.332, p<.001; odds ratio = 5.077).
Upon closer examination (Table 3), intentional flight
into IMC while operating under visual flight rules (i.e.,
VFR flight into IMC) accounted for nearly a third of the
violations observed during impoverished visual conditions. In addition, the failure to adhere to procedures/
directives (violation), poor inflight planning/decision
making (decision error), the loss of control in-flight (skillbased errors), and the failure to maintain sufficient airspeed
(skill-based error) all were commonly cited as causes during
accidents in visually impoverished conditions.
The failure to adhere to procedures/directives (violation) was also frequently seen among accidents in clear
conditions, as was poor in-flight planning/decision-making (decision error). However, unlike impoverished visual
conditions, commuter accidents occurring in the clear
were often associated with the selection of unsuitable
terrain (decision error) and the inability to compensate
for winds (skill-based error).
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Table 4. Commuter Unsafe Acts Fine-Grained Analysis by Non-Fatal vs. Fatal.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS
NON - FATAL

FATAL

Subject

N (%)

Compensation for Wind Conditions
Directional Control
Visual Lookout

44 (9.6)
44 (9.6)
35 (7.6)

Subject
Airspeed

N (%)
35 (17.9)
23 (11.7)
16 (8.2)

Aircraft Control
Proper Altitude

DECISION ERRORS
NON - FATAL
Subject
Unsuitable Terrain Selection
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Planning/Decision
NON - FATAL

Subject
Procedures/Directives
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC
Checklist

FATAL
N (%)
46 (19.3)
35 (14.7)
22 (9.2)

Subject
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Flight into Known Adverse Weather
Planning/Decision

N (%)
40 (35.1)
9 (7.9)
8 (7.0)

VIOLATIONS
N (%)
23 (19.5)
20 (16.9)
12 (10.2)

FATAL
Subject
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC
Procedures/Directives
Aircraft Weight and Balance

N (%)
37 (30.6)
28 (23.1)
9 (7.4)

Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given causal factor within the HFACS category (e.g.,
compensation for wind conditions accounted for 44 of 459 [9.6%] skill-based errors occurring in non-fatal commuter
accidents).
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Regional Comparison
Our previous investigation of GA accidents (Detwiler,
Hackworth, Holcomb, Boquet, Pfleiderer, Wiegmann, &
Shappell, 2006) suggested that differences in the pattern
of human error associated with commuter accidents in
Alaska versus the rest of the U.S. might exist. However,
unlike GA, our regional investigation of commuter aviation accidents revealed no significant differences between
Alaska and the rest of the U.S. with regard to the various
Figure 13.
135 Unsafe Acts Under Impoverished Conditions categories of unsafe acts. Even the fine-grained analysis
7. Injury severity by visual conditions.
Resulting in Figure
a Fatality
of unsafe acts revealed similar patterns for commuter
accidents occurring in Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
(Table 6). For instance, the failure to maintain adequate
100
altitude/clearance was the most frequently cited skill-based
90
error in Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
80
The only notable difference involved the type of vio70
lations and decision errors committed in Alaska versus
60
the rest of the U.S. Specifically, while the most common
50
violation occurring in the rest of the U.S. involved the
40
failure to adhere to procedures and directives; intentional
30
VFR flight into IMC was more common in Alaska. It was
20
10
also noteworthy that the decision to take off or land on
0
unsuitable terrain was observed more often in Alaska.
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Figure 8. Percentage of unsafe acts committed
by commuter aircrews during impoverished
visual conditions that resulted in fatalities.

In the present study, we examined a variety of human
and environmental factors associated with more than
1000 commercial aviation accidents over a 13-year time
frame. Given the sheer number of causal factors associated with these accidents, one might believe that there
are literally thousands of ways to crash an aircraft. The
results of this study, however, demonstrate that accidents
appearing to be unique at first glance can be organized
based upon underlying situational, demographic, and
cognitive mechanisms of accident causation. In this way,
previously unidentified trends in the accident record can
be exposed.

vs. non-fatal), it made sense to examine the combination of the two variables. As illustrated in Figure 7, the
largest percentage of fatal commuter accidents occurred
in visually impoverished conditions. In contrast, when
the accident occurred in clear visual conditions, a much
smaller percentage resulted in fatalities. Indeed, commuter
accidents were over four times more likely to result in
fatalities if they occurred in visually impoverished conditions (Χ2 = 83.978, p<.001; odds ratio = 4.256).
Perhaps more important, skill-based errors were still
the most frequently cited human error during fatal accidents in impoverished visual conditions (Figure 8).
However, the differences observed in previous analyses
between skill-based errors, decision errors, and violations
were much less obvious. Still, fully one-half of the fatal
accidents occurring in visually impoverished conditions
involved at least one violation – often intentional VFR
flight into IMC (Table 5). Not surprising, given the
environmental conditions at the time, poor in-flight
planning (decision error) was also commonly cited among
this subset of the data.

Overall
Generally speaking, nearly 70% of the “commercial”
aviation accidents occurring between 1990 and 2002 were
associated with some manner of aircrew or supervisory
error. However, the percentage varied slightly when air
carrier (45%) and commuter (75%) aviation accidents
were considered separately. This finding is consistent with
results reported elsewhere (Li et al., 2001). However,
while other studies typically focused on situational and
demographic data, this study employed a human error
framework (HFACS) to reveal the specific types of human
error associated with commercial aviation accidents.
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Table 5. Fine-Grained Analysis for Fatal
Accidents Associated with Commuter
Operations in Impoverished Conditions.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS
FATAL and IMPOVERISHED
Subject
Airspeed

N (%)
19 (16.0)
16 (13.4)
15 (12.6)

Proper Altitude
Aircraft Control

DECISION ERRORS
FATAL and IMPOVERISHED
Subject
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Flight into Known Adverse Weather
Unintentional VFR Flight into IMC

N (%)
26 (32.5)
7 (8.8)
5 (6.3)

VIOLATIONS

FATAL and IMPOVERISHED

Subject
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC
Procedures/Directives
IFR Procedure

N (%)
33 (31.7)
13 (12.5)
11 (10.6)

Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given
causal factor within the HFACS category (e.g., airspeed
accounted for 19 of 119 [16%] skill-based errors occurring in
impoverished conditions where a fatality occurred).

Table 6. Commuter Unsafe Acts Fine-Grained Analysis for Alaska versus the
Rest of the U.S.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS
Alaska
Subject

N (%)

Altitude/Clearance
Compensation for Winds

52 (20.4)
29 (11.4)

Rest of the U.S.
Subject
Altitude/Clearance
Aircraft Control

N (%)
66 (16.5)
36 (9.0)

DECISION ERRORS
Alaska
Subject
Unsuitable Terrain Selection
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Alaska

Subject
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC
Procedures/Directives

Rest of the U.S.
N (%)
39 (32.0)
18 (14.8)

Subject
In-Flight Planning/Decision
Pre-flight Planning/Decision Making

N (%)
57 (24.8)
21 (9.1)

VIOLATIONS
N (%)
38 (42.2)
14 (15.6)

Rest of the U.S.
Subject
Procedures/Directives
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC

N (%)
40 (26.8)
19 (12.8)

Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given cause factor within the HFACS causal
category (e.g., compensation for wind conditions accounted for 29 of 255 [11.4%] skill-based errors
occurring in Alaskan commuter accidents).
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Organizational Influences and Unsafe Supervision
Consistent with previous work (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001a), comparatively few commercial aviation accidents
were associated with organizational and/or supervisory
causal factors - particularly within the commuter aviation
industry. In spite of this, a relatively large proportion of
accidents involved issues related to operational processes.
Causal factors associated with the remaining HFACS
organizational causal categories, resource management and
organizational climate, were rarely observed in the data.
A closer inspection revealed that the particular type of
operational process cited appeared to be dependent on the
type of operation involved. Namely, air carrier accidents
were typically associated with the manner in which procedures or directives were communicated assuming they
existed at all. In contrast, commuter accidents were more
often associated with a lack of organizational oversight.
Exactly why this difference might exist requires a more
in-depth investigation than what was performed here.
However, the data do provide some insight into the
types of organizational influences that have impacted
commercial aviation safety.
Like organizational influences, causal factors attributed
to middle-management centered on a single causal category (i.e., inadequate supervision) rather than the full
range of unsafe supervision described within the HFACS
framework. That being said, nearly 1 in 10 air carrier accidents were associated with some manner of inadequate
supervision. However, unlike organizational factors, large
differences were not observed between air carrier and
commuter operations. Instead, when supervisors were
identified as causal in the chain of events leading to an
accident, issues such as the lack of general supervision/
oversight or the failure to provide adequate training were
usually identified.
Nevertheless, a larger question looms over the commercial accident data. Namely, “Does the current accident
data reflect the scope of the organizational/supervisory
problem within commercial aviation, or is it possible that
issues associated with middle- and upper-level management are under-reported?”
Consider, for example, a recently published report in
which 48 accidents across the spectrum of civil aviation
in India were examined using HFACS (Gaur, 2005).
Of these, nearly half (21/48) involved aircraft operations similar to those reported here. Although it was not
possible to separate their summary findings by type of
operation, it is interesting to note that Gaur reported
a large percentage of accidents were attributed, at least
in part, to organizational influences (52%) and unsafe
supervision (25%). Presumably, most of these were associated with Indian commercial aviation, since GA
operations are often not associated with the upper tiers

of HFACS (Wiegmann et. al., 2005). To the extent that
management of U.S. air carriers can be compared with
foreign-flagged air carriers, at least this research suggests
that current accident investigations may not capture all
the organizational influences associated with commercial
aviation accidents. At a minimum then, a review of how
investigators are trained on organizational and supervisory influences of accident causation may be in order. It
might also prove beneficial to incorporate the use of a
human error framework that includes supervisory and
organizational components.
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (Aircrew)
With a couple of notable exceptions, causal categories
within the preconditions for unsafe acts were also lightly
populated. One of those exceptions was the large proportion of accidents (particularly among commuter aviation)
influenced by prevailing weather conditions and reduced
visibility. This was not particularly surprising since studies
like the one conducted by Baker, Lamb, Li, and Dodd
(1993) reported similar results in their examination of
commuter accidents between 1983 and 1988. However,
what makes this particular finding noteworthy is that the
problem appears to have persisted even though the FAA
and its industry partners have gone to great lengths over
the last several years to improve pilot skills and weather
decision-making.
Likewise, a sizeable effort has been invested in crew
resource management training, particularly within the
air carrier industry. However, in the two decades since
its implementation, the debate continues over whether
or not these pioneering efforts have been effective (Salas,
Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001). After all, the findings
here and elsewhere (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a) suggest that failures
of CRM still contribute to a large proportion of commercial aviation accidents.
Even so, there may be reason for guarded optimism.
While on average nearly one in five air carrier accidents
examined here were due, at least in part, to a CRM failure,
the percentage dropped dramatically to just one out of 55
accidents in 2002, and that one involved an air carrier.
Whether this was a statistical “blip on the screen” or a
sustained improvement in the area remains to be seen.
While previous efforts suggested that factors associated
with the physical environment and crew resource management would be identified among the commercial data, it
was surprising that other areas, in particular the condition
of the operator (aircrew), were not identified in the accident
record more often. The exception involved commuter
aviation accidents, where a number of adverse mental states
(64 out of 839 accidents, or 7.2%) and physical/mental
limitations (43 out of 839, or 4.6%) were observed.
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In some ways, the fact that many commuter aviation
operations are single-piloted may explain why adverse
mental states played a more prominent role among these
accidents. For instance, without a second set of eyes in
the cockpit any distraction would likely be exacerbated
and detract the pilot from the task at hand – flying the
aircraft. Likewise, the aviation literature is ripe with
examples where pressure, either self-induced or from
management, has led pilots to accept risks beyond their
abilities. At least one study suggests that this has been an
issue with commuter aviation in Alaska (Conway, Mode,
Berman, Martin, & Hill, 2005).
Understandably then, diverted attention and pressure
(whether self-induced or from management) were occasionally cited in the commuter accident record. Because
of this, it seems that some manner of risk management
training and/or simply reinforcing the basic tenets of
aviation (i.e., aviate, navigate, and communicate – in
that order) should be a component of any intervention
strategy employed by the commuter aviation industry.
Perhaps more disconcerting than issues of attention
and psychological pressure were the large number of
commuter aviation accidents associated with the pilot’s
lack of experience – something rarely seen among the air
carrier accidents examined. Whether this represents a lack
of flight hours or merely inexperience with a particular
operational setting or aircraft remains to be determined.
Still, flight hours alone may not be sufficient to overcome
the lack of experience observed here. After all, flying
straight and level in VMC will not prepare a pilot for the
complexities of instrument flight or the dangers of flying
in other potentially hazardous environments.

is developed, it must be maintained through repetition
and experience. Thus, most people would agree that GA
pilots fly less and participate in fewer recurrent training
sessions than their commercial counterparts. It stands
to reason that their proficiency would be less than their
commercial counterparts and may explain why skill-based
errors are more prevalent among GA accidents.
However, the same cannot be said for commuter pilots
that in some cases receive more flight time than air carrier
pilots and may participate in the same level of recurrent
training. Instead, the data seem to suggest that commuter
aircrews fall somewhere in between air carrier and GA
pilots with regard to proficiency – something that, if
true, may necessitate additional regulations and currency
requirements beyond what exists within the industry.
On the other hand, the data may simply reflect wellknown differences in the sophistication of the aircraft
being flown (e.g., was the aircraft instrument certified,
was it outfitted with conventional instrumentation
or technically advanced avionics). Or it could reflect
operational requirements placed on the aircrews (e.g.,
flying very structured, well-planned operations versus
comparatively less structured flights). Perhaps there is
something still that has yet to be considered.
Regardless, skill-based errors were not the only error
form identified within the commercial aviation database.
Decision errors, violations, and, to a lesser extent, perceptual errors were found in a large proportion of the
accidents examined. For example, decision errors were
observed in roughly four out of every ten commercial aviation accidents, while violations and perceptual errors were
observed in 23% and 7% of the accidents, respectively.
Some have even argued that decision errors and violations
are of the same ilk (i.e., both involve decisions by aircrew
that go awry) and should actually be combined in the
HFACS framework. If this were true, the combined causal
category of decision error/violation would be roughly
equivalent to that seen with skill-based errors.
While on the surface, combining decision errors
and violations may make sense, given that both involve
“conscious decisions,” the motivation behind them, as
well as the intervention strategies that have proven effective in the past, argue against it. As discussed earlier,
violations represent the willful disregard for the rules and
regulations and are often driven by intrinsic motivation,
overconfidence, and other hazardous attitudes. In contrast,
decision errors are often the result of a lack of knowledge
and/or information, rather than one’s attitude.
Therefore, while scenario-based training, in-flight
planning aids, and education may improve pilot decisionmaking, these approaches have been largely ineffective in
stemming violations. Instead, enforcing current standards
and increasing accountability in the cockpit may be the

Unsafe Acts of Operators (Aircrew)
As with our previous efforts involving civil and military
aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997, 1999, 2001a,
2001b), skill-based errors were the most prevalent form
of aircrew error among the commercial aviation accidents
examined. Particularly widespread were technique errors
associated with handling or controlling the aircraft. More
important, when the commercial data reported here were
combined with our previous investigations of GA accidents (Wiegmann et al., 2005; Detwiler et. al., 2006) an
interesting finding emerged. It appears that the percentage
of skill-based errors associated with accidents increases
systematically as one moves from air carrier (43%) to
commuter (60%) to GA (73%) operations.
At first glance, this would appear to suggest that pilot
skill and proficiency are best among the air carrier industry
and become progressively more suspect within commuter
and GA. Recall that skill-based errors, by definition, occur
during the execution of routine events (Reason, 1990;
Rasmussen, 1982). Furthermore, once a particular skill
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e nvironments without the necessary instruments or
training can, and often does, lead to disaster. One needs
to look no further than the accident data reported here
to see the magnitude of this hazard to commuter aviation. That is, nearly one-half of all commuter accidents
occurred in a visually impoverished environment. Of
those, an alarming 70% resulted in fatalities. In contrast,
only about 30% of the accidents that occurred in broad
daylight resulted in a fatality.
Although interesting, this finding alone contributes
little to our understanding of “why” aircraft crash in
the weather or at night. However, when combined
with HFACS, a distinguishable pattern of human error
emerged. Indeed, while skill-based and decision errors were
cited in a large proportion of these accidents, violations
of the rules and regulations were five times more likely
to occur during accidents in visually impoverished than
in clear conditions. That is, intentional VFR flight into
IMC, poor in-flight planning, and simply the failure to
control the aircraft all were commonly associated with
fatal accidents-particularly when they occurred in visually
impoverished environments. What’s more alarming, many
of these causal factors have been identified to some extent
in the past (e.g., Baker, Lamb, Li, & Dodd, 1993).
So why is this still a problem and, more importantly,
how could a professional pilot make such a decision to
fly into hazardous weather? At least one study (Burian,
Orasanu, & Hitt, 2000) suggests that pilots with less
experience may “not trust what their eyes are telling
them and so proceed on blindly” (p. 25). Referred to as
plan continuation errors, Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare
(2002) suggest that under certain conditions these errors
are more often attributable to poor situation assessment
than to motivational judgment, per se. In other words,
sometimes experienced pilots simply misjudge the situation and make an honest mistake. Regardless, proper
planning, both in the air and on the ground, is a critical
component of flight safety. The solution may be to improve
the quality of weather-related information to the pilot so
that sound go/no-go decisions can be made.
However, it is one thing to “misjudge” weather information or make a bad decision, it is quite another
to willfully fly into IMC without proper training or
equipment. Such an act begs the question, “Why would
someone take such an exceptional risk?”
One possibility is social pressure. Indeed there are
several examples of pilots being pressured by passengers
or other aircrew to continue to their destination despite
cues that they should do otherwise (Holbrook, Orasanu,
& McCoy, 2003). In fact, at least for GA, the presence
of passengers on board seems to influence the likelihood
that an accident would be associated with VFR flight
into IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002).

only effective means to reduce violations of the rules – a
tactic that is often difficult to employ in civil aviation. As
a result, the FAA and the commercial aviation industry
may have to look to other avenues to reduce violations
such as the use of flight simulators that can demonstrate
the hazards associated with violating the rules (Knecht,
Harris, & Shappell, 2003).
Unlike skill-based errors, decision errors, and violations, perceptual errors contributed to the smallest percentage of commercial accidents, a percentage that was
much less than that found in military research (Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2003). However, given the non-tactical,
non-aerobatic nature of commercial flight, this was not
altogether unexpected. What’s more, a considerable effort
has been brought to bear over the last several decades by
the aerospace engineering and medicine communities
to improve avionics, warning devices (ground collision
avoidance systems), and awareness of perceptual errors
due to visual and vestibular illusions. It would appear
that those efforts have paid dividends.
Still, it should also be noted that the differences observed
between skill-based errors, decision errors, perceptual
errors, and violations remained largely consistent across
the 13 years of the study. The only possible exception
was observed with air carrier accidents, where violations
evidenced a small increase since 1993. Then again, some
degree of caution should be taken in interpreting this
particular finding, given that the air carrier data had to be
collapsed into 3-4 year blocks due to the relatively small
number of air carrier accidents occurring annually.
What this implies is that interventions employed in the
1990s have had, at best, ubiquitous effects on the errors
and violations committed by aircrew. Alternatively, it is
quite possible that there has been no sustained impact of
any particular intervention program. The latter should
come as no surprise given that prior to this study, no
comprehensive analysis of aircrew and supervisory error
has been conducted using a theoretically derived framework of accident causation.
14 CFR Part 135 – Commuter Operations
One of the purposes of this study was to combine the
power of traditional situational and demographic variables
with a theoretically-based, human error framework to
identify human error trends amid commercial aviation
accidents. However, because of the sample size, only commuter aviation lent itself to this sort of analysis.
Visual Conditions and Injury Severity
With the development of sophisticated navigation
instrumentation and other avionics, it is possible to
fly safely in environments without any external visual
cues. Yet, piloting an aircraft into visually impoverished
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Still, social pressures cannot fully explain why a pilot
would elect to fly VFR into IMC – particularly during
cargo or repositioning flights where no passengers are
on board. Alternatively, O’Hare and his colleagues (Batt
& O’Hare, 2005; O’Hare & Owen, 1999; O’Hare &
Smitheram, 1995) have offered an explanation structured
around how pilots frame the situation of continuing or
discontinuing flight into adverse weather. They found
that pilots who framed diverting from a flight plan as a
loss (e.g., loss of time, economic loss, or expense of effort)
tend to continue flight into adverse weather; whereas
those who frame a rerouting decision as a gain (e.g., in
personal safety) tend to divert more. Indeed, gains and
losses take on more meaning as pilots get closer to their
destination.
Another possibility is that commuter pilots, on average, may not have the requisite experience to decide
when a particular situation is beyond their ability. While
this argument may hold for GA, where pilot experience
varies from the novice to pilots with thousands of flight
hours, commuter pilots typically have more experience
than their GA counterparts well before their first paying
passenger boards the aircraft. However, experience is a
double-edged sword as others (e.g., Thomson, Onkal,
Avcioglu, & Goodwin, 2004) have suggested that, as
pilots gain experience through more flight hours, risk
taking may also increase due to overconfidence and successful exposure to risky events. Put simply, experts may
be more likely to take risks than novices.

Although their study did not identify any specific reason
these pilots were more prone to take risks, it did suggest that factors such as “pilot fatigue and experience,
financial pressures on operators, and inadequate weather
information,” particularly in combination, may provide
some clues.
Another area where regional differences existed
involved takeoff and landing from unsuitable terrain.
Although rarely associated with fatalities, these accidents
are no less important given the staggering cost to recover
an aircraft stuck on a sandbar or some other remote area.
Unlike VFR flight into IMC, these accidents are much
easier to understand because there are simply not many
concrete runways and taxiways in Alaska. Instead, Alaskan commuter pilots may have to resort to frozen ice,
sandbars, and other “natural runways” for support. Not
surprising, what appears suitable from the air turns out
to be unsuitable for aircraft when landed upon.
The obvious solution is to provide more suitable runways; pour more concrete, if you will. However, given the
remoteness and harsh conditions of some of these areas,
providing traditional runways would not be practical.
Alternatively, some sort of training and awareness of
what constitutes a suitable landing area, combined with
the creation of more traditional runways, where possible,
may be the only viable solution.
In light of the unique nature of the Alaskan environment, the FAA and Alaskan aviation community have
joined efforts to employ a variety of safety programs aimed
at reducing accidents associated with commuter operations. With programs like the FAA’s Circle of Safety and
Capstone, and non-profit aviation safety organizations like
the Medallion Foundation, it is hoped that improvements
in Alaskan aviation safety will be realized.

Regional Differences
In many ways, Alaska is the one of the world’s most
demanding aviation environments, offering virtually every
situation a pilot or operator might be confronted with. In
a sense, there are very few situations experienced by pilots
in the lower 48 states that have not been experienced by
those in Alaska. Perhaps this is why few differences were
observed in the pattern of human error associated with
Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
However, one area where differences did exist was the
violation of the rules and regulations; to be specific, VFR
flight into IMC. Precisely why commuter pilots would
be more prone to fly into adverse weather in Alaska than
the rest of the U.S. is unknown, but at least one study
(Conway, et. al., 2005) has shown that aircrews of highrisk operators in Alaska (those with a higher fatal crash
rate than would be expected given the number of pilots
they employed) differed from other operators in both
experience and working conditions. On average pilots of
high risk operators worked one hour more per day and
10 hours more per week than control pilots. They were
also more likely to fly into unknown weather conditions.

CONCLUSIONS
We are often told that sometimes the best studies ask
more questions than they answer. If that sage wisdom is
indeed true, then perhaps the present study was worthwhile. Regardless of one’s opinion of accident data and the
current aviation accident investigation process, these data
represent our best understanding of the underlying human
error component of commercial aviation accidents. Even
more, the results presented here represent the marriage
of traditional demographic and human error analyses of
commercial aviation (air carrier and commuter). While
some of the findings may come as no surprise, they do
provide data, where often only opinion existed. What’s
more, they provide a foundation for the development,
implementation, and quantifiable assessment of putative
intervention and mitigation strategies.
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